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The relevance of political connections in the business world is a reality which may 
beneficiate both sides. In Portugal, there is anecdotal evidence of these particular 
connections, regarding the entrance of former politicians in private and listed 
companies. Last October, former State Secretary of Public Works, Paulo Campos, gave 
an interview to Sábado magazine which, after the exit from the Government, he 
confirmed that companies, that negotiated public-private partnerships with his office, 
invited him to relevant positions in the board despite of his denial for the solicitations.  
This case is an independent event in which the political connection was not run until the 
end, although it does not mean that all the cases have the same end as this particular 
one. Indeed, a company would benefit from the influence of such people in several areas 
of its business strategy and the former politician would beneficiate from being 
employed for the board of a relevant firm in the national context.  
There are still pertinent questions raised by this topic, regarding the conflict of interests 
of the two sides and consequential reputational effects fueled by the media. This 
question is, perhaps, one of the more polemic issues of this theme. As Choi and Thum 
(2007) frame it: Are politically connected firms a boon or a burden from a welfare 
perspective?  
The adjacent reasons for a company to employ a former politician are related with 
institutional arrangements which favor the clientelism and lobbyism in the past; or, on 
the other hand, is the former politician being hired for the future benefits that could 
derive from the political connections and influences in the society as well as his 
knowledge and experience as professional?  
Regarding this subject in the Portuguese context, Cabo (2012) shows the market 
penalizes a political appointment to top corporate positions, implying that the benefits 
conceded by the former politician were granted in the past. We used the same data 
prepared by Cabo (2012) in order to take into account political appointments of 
Portuguese firms listed in the EuroNext Lisbon Index, which are reported to the market 
regulator, Comissão de Mercados de Valores Mobiliários (CMVM).  
Cabo (2012) had a sample of 402 appointments from 46 different listed firms over a 
period of 12 years between 2001 and 2012. 93 of the observations corresponded to 
political appointments. In our case, as we are taking into account the variation of several 




we further removed the bank industry from the sample. We were left with a universe of 
327 observations of which 70 are political nominations, representing almost 21% of the 
total number of appointments. The data for the variables on the firms used in this 
empirical study was taken from Bloomberg. 
The observations are taken from the CMVM database of relevant events concerning 
listed firms, with the indication of the time stamp of the record. Each appointment 
usually involves more than one executive, ranging from cases where one single person 
is named to some cases in which more than 20 executives are being nominated. The 327 
observations hence involve 1721 individual appointments (including repeated 
appointments over several years and/or over several firms) and 60 different former 
politicians (who occasionally are appointed to consecutive executive terms or in 
different corporations).  
We define as political nomination the appointment of a former Prime Minister, or a 
former Minister or a former State Secretary, in any of the Constitutional Governments 
in Portugal since 1976 (from the 6
th
 Provisional Government in 1976 until the 18
th
 
Constitutional Government, which is the Cabinet that precedes the current 
Government). 
It is important to indicate that we are not considering many other politically connected 
executives. There are numerous appointees that may be affiliated with political parties, 
they may have taken political and public offices in the past, but if they were never 
central governmental officials at the three top levels mentioned, then they will not be 
regarded as politicians in our sample.
1
 
We made several distinctions, regarding the types of nominations in our sample. First of 
all, we created a dummy to identify a political nomination, when the appointment 
included a former cabinet member. Next, we distinguished the politicians between 
center-left and center-right parties, depending on the Government to which the political 
appointee belonged. In Portugal, we can distinguish between center-left or center-right 
governments, depending on the government being dominated either by the Socialist 
Party (center-left) or the Social Democratic Party (center-right), even when these 
governments were coalition cabinets. Further, in each observation, we distinguish 
between appointments that have former politicians from one or both parties. Cabo 
(2012) evidenced that the market reacts differently to political nominations when both 
                                                          
1 This may lead us to disregard people that have strong political ties, some of which still active during the corporate tenure. We are 




political families are represented. We also considered the potential link between the 
governmental experience and the industry to which the former politician is now being 
appointed to. Another characteristic of the political nominations takes into account the 
coincidence between the political family of the appointee and the ruling party at the 
time of the appointment. Finally, we analyzed appointments in firms, in which the 
Portuguese Government still had equity shares at the time of the appointment. 
The empirical study of this area in Portugal is still very recent, despite the attention 
given by media to political nominations in private corporations. Through the reported 
political and non-political nominations to CMVM, we are looking for the possible 
impacts that former politicians could have inside a company, one year after his 
nomination. Foremost, we want to identify the benefits that a presence of a political 
connection might have in two specific aspects: easier access to long-term and short-term 
debt and tax benefits reliefs. Over the issue of access to financing, we found evidence 
that political connections facilitate borrowing and reduce interest rates. On the issue of 
political connections carrying tax advantages to the firms, we found no evidence to 
sustain such hypothesis.  
Then, we measure the performance of the firms which recruited former politicians. For 
this particular subject, we tested two variables: market capitalization and dividend per 
share (DPS) after the entrance of the political connections. The results on market 
capitalization evidence a negative impact of political ties in the firm, with a decrease of 
around 32 to 39%. These results validate and expand to the medium term the 
conclusions from Cabo (2012), confirming that in Portugal we do not observe the same 
behavior as the one predicted by the literature regarding other markets (Faccio, 2002; 
Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Concerning DPS, the results show 
significance in two characteristics: The coincidence of the cabinet occupied by the 
former politician in the Government and the industry group of the politically connected 
firm affects negatively the DPS and the decrease is stronger and significantly higher 
when we focus on political connections from the left wing. 
The admission of former politicians with relevant professional experience and 
substantial networking opportunities will benefit the hiring companies (Faccio, 2002). 
As such, we expect the risk of these corporations to decrease. We measured this risk 
using Altman’s Z-score, and assessed if this measurement changed after the 
appointment of former politicians. However, when the political nomination is from the 




significant evidence that Altman Z-score’s decrease by more than 0.96, which it is an 
indication that a company´s perceived risk increases when a center-left politician comes 
on board.  
Finally, we also addressed the possibility of the firms who hire former politicians 
having different investment decisions from the other companies. We did this using at 
first capital expenditures, but we found no evidence of differences between politically 
connected firms and the other firms in this variable. Where we found significant 
differences is in the change in employees’ number, indicating that politically connected 
hire substantially more employees that the other firms. This is consistent with previous 
empirical studies (Faccio, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), which claim that former 
politicians are moved by political motivations in order to earn votes for future elections. 
In general, this effect is present in firms with appointments of former politicians from 
the center-right, but not in appointments from the center-left. However, when we 
restricted ourselves to measuring this effect on political appointments coinciding with 
the ruling party, we found evidence in either political family. It is pertinent that such 
situation actually happens and it could point to the fact that former politicians try to 
assist his fellows by having an expansionist behavior, with a higher number of 
employees than the firm actually needs.  
In summary we present extensive evidence that, in Portugal, there are strong 
connections between the corporate and the political worlds. That evidence indicates that 
the market does not acknowledge former politicians as a value adding proposition to the 
companies. Instead, even potential benefits of hiring former politicians arising at the 
financing level, are largely engulfed by additional costs, such aggressive employment 
policies with no visible explanation on the investment growth. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the existing literature; 
Section 3 describes the data we use to perform this study; Section 4 presents in detail 
the variables we computed; Section 5 describes the methodology as well as the 
hypotheses; Section 6 presents the empirical analysis and the main results of this study 





2. Literature Review 
The relationship between ex-politicians and private companies is a field with a variety 
of studies in several countries. The constant looking for maximization of the profit and 
enlargement of value added to the shareholder, lead firms to squeeze the nexus with 
former politicians, hiring them for relevant positions inside the company where they 
would have a relevant role in the decision making of the company’s strategy. But the 
main question is: Will this particular person add new value and benefits for the 
company or, on the other hand, the value was collected in the past, when this person 
was in the Government?  
Before we examine the conditions and terms of debt financing in political-connected 
firms, it is important to refer the influence exerted by Governments in the banking 
sector and the existent literature. The relevance of banks’ ownership by Government 
potentiates domestic markets with lower interest rates than the ones offered by the 
private sector, and benefits are higher when the firms are larger or if the political party 
has stronger dominance (Sapienza, 2003). Dinç (2004) found Government-owned banks 
enhance their borrowing operations in election years relatively to private banks, and 
often times government-owned banks are used as an instrument to earn votes, losing 
their efficiency and objective, which could motivate large losses and, therefore, higher 
indirect costs for the taxpayers. The impact by Government actions in the private sector 
could be perverse and harmful, creating an appurtenant pressure in the banking system. 
In Malaysia, political interests influenced government interventions in failing banks and 
politicians use banking regulation to indulge their supports and smite who oppose 
(Brown and Dinç, 2005). An accomplished example was the bank consolidation adopted 
in that country, which enforced banks to fuse and become six large banks. Jayasankaran 
(1999) defended that the banks owned by followers of then-Prime Minister were 
benefited and they got the leadership of the new-found merged banks, for as much as 
the owners of the banks who stood against the Prime Minister, received adverse 
conditions in the deal. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) displayed that 
Government ownership of banks is related with slower financial and economic 
development and it is consequently related with lower growth of per capita income and, 
therefore, overall productivity. The pressures in the banking system can be relevant and 
they are driven by political motivations, to earn more votes or to succor affiliates from a 




French state bank, lost billions of dollars making dubious loans to the friends of 
socialist party” pointing out that this conduct is not unusual in developed countries and 
firms’ financing can be facilitated by political pressures on behalf of private interests. 
From these three particular topics, private interests, political pressures and banking 
sector, raise a higher subject: financing of politically connected firms. Regarding the 
relationship between banks and governments, the deliberation begins when the politics 
integrate the board of a private company with particular interests and needs, different 
from the ones shared by the government, which can be satisfied by the influence of the 
political connection in a particular area: debt financing. Indeed, Khwanja and Miari 
(2002) found evidence that politically connected firms borrow 45% more than non-
connected firms, exclusively in government banks, and firms with “stronger” 
politicians, figured as the number of votes obtained by the politician or the political 
party, are able to gather even higher preferential access.  
The paper that more closely relates this current work is probably Faccio (2002). It 
showed that politically connected firms had, indeed, higher leverage ratios and this 
evidence is even stronger when the particular former politician is also shareholder of the 
firm. Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) support that firms politically connected are less 
dependent from market to issue debt and even realign its financing strategy in 
comparison with non-connected firms. Charumilind, Kali and Wiwattanakantang (2009) 
test whether political connections are a good predictor to access to long-term debt, prior 
to the Asian crisis of 1997-98 and politically connected firms are required fewer 
collateral for the long-term borrowings despite of short term borrowing decrease. This 
particular study not only points out as political connections the most important factor to 
set out the access to long term but also indicates that the connections might surpass 
firms’ characteristics. An event study by Faccio and Parsley (2007), that tested what 
was the effect in connected firms when its connection suddenly died, found evidence 
that there is a significant drop in the access to debt by such firms and, in market values, 
there is a market adjustment by -1,7%. Adding to the empirical studies, there are 
anecdotal events which pointing out that President Suharto, former President of 
Indonesia, tried to protect firms with needs of raising capital. The Texmaco group 
issued loans in excess of 1 Billion dollars from Bank Negara Indonesia, one of the 
biggest state banks. The loans far surpass the bank’s legal limit and, instead, they were 




financial crisis.” Founder of the company was known as one of the closest friends to 
Suharto (Solomon, 1999).  
The effects of political connections can also be calculated by market’s reaction to the 
presence of a politically connected person to a particular firm. Faccio (2002) revealed 
that, in a study with more than 40 countries, politically connected firms have a higher 
market capitalization and it is significantly higher when the connection is also 
shareholder. In 1998 in Malaysia, during the Asian crisis, with the imposition of capital 
controls, from the estimated $5 Billion earnings, 32% were calculated as attributed to 
the increase in value of connections, induced by the increase of subsidies to the firms 
linked to Prime Minister (Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  
Regarding the only known study in Portugal in this particular theme, Cabo (2012) found 
out, through an event study, that political appointments to the board of Portuguese listed 
companies are perceived by the market as harmful in the company’s strategy, the only 
exception occurs when the appointment is balanced with center-right and center-left 
former politicians. On the contrary, Fisman (2001) found evidence that political 
connections are very relevant in the Indonesian economy and rumors about President 
Suharto’s health had a substantial impact in stock market returns of firms politically 
connected, which were significantly lower. Contrarily to Cabo (2012), an event study 
regarding the 2000’s elections in USA, Goldman, Rocholl and So (2006) found the 
nominations which involve firms linked to Republican party increase in value while 
announcements of the nomination of Democratic Party had a decrease in value. 
Despite the several reactions from the market to the entrance of politically connected 
individuals, how do firms behave with such connections on their boards afterwards? 
Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) found evidence in Indonesia that firms with political 
connections have a better performance if the political connection is related to the party 
in the Government, otherwise they could have a worst performance than non-connected 
firms. After the transparency law which forced all members from the Bundestag to open 
information about the additional income from other activities, it was found that 
politically connected firms have a better performance, in rubrics as ROE, earnings, sales 
or total assets, over non-connected firms and the effect is higher if the compensation to 
the former politician increases (Niessen and Ruenzi, 2007). A better performance in 
politically connected firms does not depend on either the market is developed or 
emerging: an empirical study covering several countries and industries also found 




(Husson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2004). On the other hand, it has been found that the 
influence of politicians in listed firms might be negative when they are mislead with 
political motivations which could prompt firms to have unnecessary costs (Boubakri, 
Cosset and Saffar, 2008; Faccio, 2002; Faccio, Masulis and McConnell, 2005; Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1994). Political connections do have control over firms and banks with the 
view to yield employment, subsidies and other benefits, who respond the boon with 
votes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The fluctuation of firm’s performance also could 
depend on the number of subsidies the Government are able to provide to these firms 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). 
The benefits to politically connected companies could be even higher if the ranking 
perceived in the Corruption Perception Index is higher and the protection of property 
rights is considerably lower (Faccio, 2002). The forecasted earnings of a company 
politically connected, from equity analysts and investment banks, are harder to predict 
and to accurate, causing adverse conditions for equity researchers, and the information 
asymmetry could be deeper, between managers and investors, when the corruption is 
higher, although anti-corruption measures could repeal this effect on the corporate 
information environment (Chan, Ding and Kim, 2010). The reason for a lower quality 
of information of the accounting reports might be related to a lower dependency of the 
markets (Channey, Faccio and Parsley, 2011) in consistent with the possibility of 
possessing privileged access to loans from banks. 
The risk could be higher, specifically, in cash concerns, since political connections have 
a negative impact in cash holdings, indicating that they may extract private benefits 
since connected firms exhibit a tendency of hoard more cash than non-connected peers 
and the effect is higher in countries with weak legal protection of investors (Kusnadi 
and Wei, 2011). Politically connected firms may also have legal concessions regarding 
the taxes they have to settle to the Government (Faccio, 2002). A good example of tax 
allowances was the event, in 1996, when the Russian President Yeltsin signed a decree 
which allowed tax breaks and other kind of aid for some particular firms (Faccio, 2009). 
The effects of political connections in private and listed companies are tested in plenty 
of areas, in spite of still remaining many issues and countries to study. Our challenge is 
to test some variables over the Portuguese listed companies and understand whether 




3. Data Description 
The study comprises the 47 listed companies in EuroNext Lisbon Stock Exchange, and 
we used the same database prepared in Cabo (2012). 
Each observation in our study will be a single appointment reported by the Portuguese 
financial markets regulator (CMVM) from 2001 to 2011. Cabo (2012), who was 
running a short window event study further used the 2012 announcements, which we 
had to drop, since our study concerns yearly changes. 
Each appointment may have one or more people being nominated for top corporate 
positions inside the listed company. These positions range from CEO, Chairman or 
President until non-executive members of the governing bodies. The governance 
structure of these companies and composition of the governing bodies varies 
significantly from company to company. We will get back to this point when we detail 
the characteristics of the appointments. 
We will complement the data on the appointments from Cabo (2012) with corporate 
information on the particular firms taken from Bloomberg’s corporate database for the 
Portuguese stock exchange. 
In addition to dropping the 2012 appointments, we also excluded the banking industry 
from our, because these have particular characteristics in many of the financing 
decisions and performance and risk measurements. This left us with 327 appointments 
from 41 different firms
2
, involving 1721 individual appointments. Note that these 
individual appointments do not refer to 1721 different individuals, as there is a 
substantial number of repeated appointments and accumulation of roles in different 
companies. We identified however 60 different former politicians and carefully revised 
their curriculums. Of the 327 appointments, 70 include at least one of these former 
politicians and occur in 26 different firms. This means that only 15 firms in our sample 
did not hire former politicians as we define them. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
Over the entrance for the board of political nominations, we did not distinguish between 
the several positions it is possible to occupy in the top board. We treat all the 
appointments as the same despite of the different roles they might have inside the 
organization. We defend that, in the top corporate positions, the influence over some 
                                                          




areas as well as the political network far exceed the position in the firm. We are aware 
that these assumptions will affect some of our results, but for the most part, this should 
artificially decrease and not increase the significance of our results. As such, we believe 
that this simplification is actually an argument in favor of the statistical robustness of 
the results we find. 
From the study of Cabo (2012) the concept of a political appointment is described as 
“political when within the set of executives appointed there is at least one executive that 
at any time before the day of the appointment held a position such as Prime-Minister, 
Minister or Junior Minister during one of the Portuguese Constitutional Governments”. 
Indeed, despite the number of people appointed in a single nomination, one former 
politician is enough to consider a nomination as political.  
The data contains former politicians since the 6
th
 Provisional Government in September 
1976, until the 18
th
 Constitutional Government. It is predictable that our used data 
hardly includes all the former Portuguese politicians hired by listed companies for 2 
main reasons: First, there are other types of former politicians, as former mayors, 
members of Parliament, political parties’ officials, among other positions in local, 
regional or central politics, which are not included in the sample as former politicians. 
The second reason the possibility of former politicians being hired to occupy non-top 
positions in the company, which are not reported to CMVM. We will not be able to 
trace these former politicians as well. Just as a curiosity, we did not detect any female 
former politicians in our sample, which explain why we refer to former politicians 
always as “he” or “him”. 
We distinguished the individual politicians between “center-left” and “center-right” 
depending on which Governments they belonged to. In Portugal, since 1976, there were 
20 different governments, starting with the last provisional government after the 1974 
Carnation Revolution until the current 19
th
 Constitutional Government. Almost all of 
these governments
3
 were lead by prime-ministers that can somehow be affiliated to one 
of the two largest political parties, the Socialist Party (center-left) or the Social 
Democratic Party (center-right), even when these governments were coalition cabinets. 
We used the affiliation of the prime-ministers to label the politicians in our sample as 
right or left. These labels will be transferred to the appointments depending on the 
former politicians appointed. As such, the nominations can be of only one side party, or 
                                                          
3 There are 2 Prime Ministers that had no political affiliation in two cabinets appointed directly by the President. These two 




both parties included and we have 16 nominations with both parties, 18 with only left-
wing politicians involved and 36 with former members of right-wing governments. 
Following the previous idea, we estimated regressions where we distinguished left and 
right wing appointee, with two dummies. 
We also took into consideration the coincidence between the functional area of the 
cabinet position (for example, Ministries of Finance, Industry, Energy, Economy, 
Health, Environment, Defense) and the hiring firm’s industry. Indeed, this coincidence 
should provide greater benefits to the company since the former politician’s experience 
is larger. On the hand, these links may also hint at the connections between the 
politician and the hiring firm pre-dating the appointment. Table 2, in the appendix, 
shows how we allocated each area of the Government to the industry group of the 
politically connected firms for the cases arising in our sample. It is important to refer 
that we regarded the positions of Prime Minister
4
 and Deputy Minister of Prime 
Minister to be coincident with all industries. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Then, we separated the listed firms where the Portuguese Government still had some 
equity stakes. To do this operation we had to look over the annual reports of Parpública 
and Caixa Geral de Depósitos to identify 6 firms
5
, comprising 70 nominations and, from 
those, 21 involved former politicians. Naturally these are the firms where we expect the 
political links to be stronger.  
We next considered the ruling party at the time of the nomination. Between 2001 and 
2011 we had 5 different governments with the center left ruling between 2001 and 2002, 
and between 2005 and mid 2011. We crossed the nominations which have the ruling 
party in order to see if there were significant distinctions, in comparison with the other 
political nominations.  
Table 3 summarizes the number of political nominations along the outlined 
characteristics.  
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
                                                          
4 There is only one former Prime-minister in our sample. Mr Francisco Pinto Balsemão is the CEO of a large media group 
(IMPRESA) and was the prime ministers to the 7th and 8th Constitutional Governments. 
5 Parpublica is the holding company of the Portuguese Republic and Caixa Geral de Depositos is the state-owned banking 




4. Variables Tested 
In this section we describe in more detail, the several variables regarding the role of 
former politicians in listed companies.  
The variables are divided into four major fields of interest. First, we looked at the 
possible benefits that a political connection could offer to a company, after his presence 
in the Government, along two relevant items: access to financing and tax benefits.  
Secondly, we studied firms’ performance in association with political connections, over 
two categories. Thirdly, taking this line of argument to a further level, we want to 
inspect the influence over the investment decisions that a political connection could 
bring and the political motivations associated to those decisions. Fourth and finally, we 
looked at firms’ risk measurements. We want to test whether the entrance of a former 
politician is, indeed, a boon for the company and is conducive to a risk decrease; or, 
alternatively, if it is a burden that may increase the risk after the entrance of the former 
politician, in which case the current hiring brings no benefit to the company and could 
be linked to past patronage at the time he was in the government to the company now 
hiring him. 
The data on the appointments were taken from Cabo (2012), the firm specific data were 
taken from Bloomberg or the individuals firms’ annual reports. In some regressions we 
had to further drop some observations, because occasionally we were unable to provide 
the necessary data. 
4.1 Benefits 
Regarding the benefits of political connections for listed firms, we thought there would 
be two major areas where former politicians could establish their influence, creating 
value to the firm: access to financing, and tax benefits.  
The relationship among the banking sector and the Government allowed us to suppose 
that such privileged connections could be lengthen into the future, with easy credit 
access and better interest rates concessions, granted to the former politicians after their 
move on to their private corporations’ top positions. On the other hand, the banks would 
also benefit from an increased the number of clients and from stronger links and easier 
access to firms’ top management, hence decreasing their risk. We looked over three 
Bloomberg variables in order to understand whether the access to debt is, actually, 




We also want to test if politically connected firms receive tax benefits. To test 
hypotheses we need to use the Effective Tax Rate bore by firms. 
Over these variables, we are expecting to have a more detailed picture on how former 
politicians could yield benefits for connected firms. 
4.2 Firm’s Performance 
We want to test if former politicians bring value and enhance performance of the firms 
that hire them. According to the literature it is expected that they could assist firms in 
order to have profitable contracts as they are able to influence decision making of public 
bids and the performance of politically connected firms would be higher comparing 
with non-connected ones. However, Cabo (2012) indicates that in Portugal the market 
does not anticipate this behavior at all. To clarify with Cabo’s conclusions hold in a 
longer time horizon, we suggest two variables to measure performance: Market 
Capitalization and Dividend per Share. 
4.3 Investment Decisions 
We also wanted to test investment decisions of politically connected firms in 
comparison with non-political ones. In fact, considering that political connections could 
open several opportunities in the Portuguese business environment, it is acceptable to 
believe that politically connected firms change their investment decisions to avail from 
such advantages granted by their influence. We will proxy this by considering the 
Capital Expenditures variable in our analysis. Further developing this idea, we wanted 
to test, however, if there is any growth associated to the companies that hire former 
politicians. Previous literature suggests that former politicians will induce aggressive 
employment policies in anticipation of return to the politics. As such, we will measure 
the change in number of employees of the firms considered in our sample. 
4.4 Risk 
Since we had already taken attention to benefits provided by political ties, firm’s 
performance with such connections as well as the influence in firm’s investment 
decisions, we thought that it might be reasonable to measure the risk, regarding the 
liquidity and insolvency’s probability, by the entrance of a former politician. Thereby, 





5. Hypotheses Development and Methodology 
To perform the empirical tests, we used the event study methodology which measures 
the impact of a certain event on a corporate variable, analyzing its variation between 
two periods. In our particular study, we examined the change in the variables tested 
between the period before the nomination and the period after the nomination in order to 
have a more consistent and solid impact of the entrance of a former politician. We 
wanted to capture the differences between firms with political ties and firms without 
such ties. 
The first hypothesis where we use this approach concerns the access to credit, where we 
test the hypothesis that politically connected will have easier access to long term 
borrowings. For this purpose we run a set of regressions based on the following model: 
  
            
            
                                                   (1) 
 
Where   
            
            
 measures the percentage change in long term borrowings, as 
presented by Bloomberg over total assets; political dummy will be the different 
dummies capturing the existence of former politicians in the nominations or the 
different political characteristics of the nominations, ROE measures the Return on 
Equity for the year in which the nomitation takes place and          measures the 
change in the investment policies. The need to use ROE and change in CAPEX derives 
from the fact that we need to control for easier access to credit to companies that are 
more profitable and/or are investing. To confirm the hypothesis, we expect the 
coefficients on the political dummies to be positive, indicating that politically connected 
firms will have better access to credit. 
We further use another metrics of access to credit with the change in absolute value of 
short term borrowings. The reason we switch from relative long term to absolute values 
in short term borrowings concerns the fact that short term borrowings increase in a more 
dynamic fashion that long term loans. As such, the absolute increase short term 
borrowings is a better measurement of quick access to credit than the relative value. The 
following model is used on the regressions that test the hypothesis that politically 
connected firms will have easier access to short term borrowings: 





The variable                   denotes the change in absolute short term borrowing 
and all other variables are the same as in model (1). Again we expect the coefficients on 
the political dummies to be positive. 
Next we test the hypothesis that politically connected firms will pay lower interest rates 
on loans. The effective interest rate supported by firms is more related to the perception 
of the firm’s risk to not pay the loan to the banks. The following model is used to test 
this hypothesis: 
                                                                                
 
The variable                captures the change in the effective interest rate and 
                    denotes the percentage change in total debt, which we use to 
control for the fact that firms borrowing more will have higher risk. The other variables 
are the same as the ones used in the previous regressions. We expect the hypothesis to 
be confirmed if the coefficients on the political dummies are negative. 
To test the hypothesis that politically connected firms benefit from better fiscal 
conditions, we run regressions on the following model: 
                                                                      (4) 
 
The variable           represents the change in the effective tax rate as measured by 
Bloomberg and the presence of              is necessary to accommodate changes in 
the tax rate due to enhanced profitability and the 2011 dummy is necessary since the 
Government increased severely the corporate tax rate in this particular year, as a 
consequence of the fiscal adjustment program currently undergoing in Portugal. To 
confirm the hypothesis we expect the coefficients on the political dummies to be 
negative. 
A further set of hypotheses concerns the impact of former politicians on firm 
performance.  
We measure that by running regressions on the following model: 
                                                                                      (5) 
 
             measures the change in market capitalization, and              




measures the return on the Portuguese capital market, to capture the portion of the 
increase in market cap that is not due to specific firm performance. Firm’s Market 
Capitalization, indeed, depends on a plenty of factors, perceptions, disclosed 
information, firm’s need to raise capital, among other variables. Using our model, we 
intend to isolate most of these factors and negatives coefficients on the political 
dummies will confirm our hypothesis based on Cabo (2012) that in Portugal the market 
does not perceive former politicians as adding value. 
Another performance measurement concerns the dividend paying policies. A better 
performing company would increase their dividend per share (DPS). The advantage of 
this measurement is that it would capture the performance of the company beyond the 
market’s assessment. This would help us validate the traditional hypothesis in the 
literature that politicians add value, despite the local market perception outlined in Cabo 
(2012) that they do not. As such our hypothesis is that politically connected firms 
increase their DPS. 
                                                                  (6) 
 
Because there are several reasons to change DPS beyond profitability we try to capture 
these, by adding the change in profitability (            ) and the need self finance 
investment (        ) to our model. A positive coefficient on the political dummies will 
confirm our hypothesis that politically connected firms better compensate their 
shareholders through dividends. 
The next hypothesis addresses the possibility that politically connected firms grow more 
than the others, regarding the number of employees. The following model is used to test 
this hypothesis, which will be confirmed if the coefficients on the political dummies are 
positive: 
                                                                        (7) 
 
We believe these corporate independent variables have decent conditions to substantiate 
firm’s employer policy and, thereby, the changes of the dependent variable, which could 
be, significantly, explained by the entrance of a former politician, might stand for a 
marrowy influence of such political connections in firm’s investment decision, 




Finally, our last regression concerns firm’s risk through a ratio that comprises several 
ratios, namely the firm’s networking capital, retained earnings, firm’s market value, 
among other items, and, so, to perform a regression, having as dependent variable the 
change of Altman’s Z-Score
6
, we decided to have, as unique independent variable, the 
political dummy, since there are too many items included in the ratio and they would be 
correlated with the dependent variable. 
                                                (8) 
 
Over this regression, we expect to test whether the entrance of a political tie influences 
the probability of insolvency by the firm, in the future, namely a positive coefficient on 
the political dummies is expected as this would increase the Altman’s Z-Score and 
hence reduce the probability of default.  
Next we will analyse the results of all these regressions. 
 
6. Empirical Results and Discussion 
Due to the several distinctions over political connections and the several variables used, 
we divided each table according to the political nominations’ characteristics, in order to 
have a more focused exposition of the empirical results as well as to be able to discuss 
each characteristic of political connections with consistence and substance. Among this 
section, we will present 6 tables regarding the several characteristics of political 
connections we had studied.  
6.1 Political and non-political connections in firms’ top corporate boards 
In table 4, we tested the significance of nominations which had former politicians in the 
simplest form. The variable political dummy assumed the value 1, if any of the 
appointed board members had a political position after the VI Provisional Government 
in 1976, and prior to the day of the appointment. Regarding the results of the 
regressions, we can conclude that, indeed, there are political dummies with significance, 
confirming that former politicians could influence several fields inside a firm. 
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
                                                          
6 Altman’s Z-Score was a formula for predicting bankruptcy, published in 1968, by Edward I. Altman. The formula is as follows: 
Altman’s Z-Score = 1,2 
               
           
 + 1,4 
                 
           
 + 3,3 
    
           
 + 0,6 
                     
                        
 + 1,0 
           





On the benefits models, regarding the hypothesis that political connections facilitate the 
access to financing, we can show that the presence of politicians in general facilitate 
access to short term credit (2), since the coefficient on the political is positive and 
significant at 5%, and the most significant effect is the drop in the interest rate (3) of 
about 1,6 percentage points, significant at 2,5%. We found no evidence that the 
presence of politicians in general affect long term debt or tax benefits. 
According to these results, there is empirical evidence that politically connected firms 
have more favorable conditions offered, which might be related to the strong relation 
between banks and the Government, that in several times had to intervened in the 
banking industry in order to support troubled banks or that political ties might influence 
state-banks, forcing them to offer lower interest rates for the companies they are 
representing. It is undeniable the banking sector and politics hold hands and the relation 
might be extended after the politician gets out from the political stages.  
On another issue, looking to firm’s performance, Market Capitalization had a significant 
drop of 39 percentage points, significant at 10%. This idea follows the study of Cabo 
(2012), which supported that the market’s perception of a politically connected 
nomination is negative. The short term effect illustrated in that paper is extended here to 
a one year window event study and the perception that former politicians subtract value 
is sustained. Another reason which could take the market to perceive politically 
connected firms as a bad investment might be related to the information disclosed. 
Indeed, politically connected firms could have some irregularities, associated with the 
renegotiated contracts with banks or suspected benefits granted, reflecting, then, poor 
information disclosed in the reports and announcements which might lead the market to 
consider as a bad investment. 
Looking at the investment decisions models, there is significance at less than 1% level 
that politically connected firms increase the number of employees by over a 1200 new 
admissions. A higher number of collaborators could indicate a higher production which 
it would increase the profit of company, although such effect is not consubstantiated  by 
the other independent variables in the regression. This empirical evidence suggest that 
the findings from previous studies (Faccio, 2002 and Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), 
defending that former politicians use private firms to carry out their political 
campaigning agendas are not be excluded in Portugal as well. The increase of the 
number of employees, without a proportional growth of the company, might also 




since the staff costs increase reasonably, decreasing the operational margin, raising a 
negative perspective by the market. 
From the findings, it is reasonable to say that political connections concede benefits to 
politically connected firms, although they also benefit from the firms by availing their 
political aspirations for the future, which is reflected in the high number of employees 
hired. The market’s performance of politically connected firms is considerably lower 
than a non-political one. 
6.2 The impact of the number of political parties in politically connected firms 
Table 5 reassesses the 8 models now using a variable (“political dummy”) that counts, 
from 0 to 2, the number of political parties in each appointment. The results are similar 
to the previous ones, with some interesting particularities in the coefficients and the 
levels of significance, now amplified by the nature of the political dummy variable.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Regarding benefits that politically connected firms are able to have with 2 parties in the 
company, there is a positive impact in the Long-term Borrowings over Total Assets of 
2,189 percentage points for each party addition to the apointment, significant at 10%, 
while the absolute values of Short-Term Borrowings, is also significant at 10%. Finally, 
when we had tested the effective interest rate, there is a change of -0,9 percentage points 
per party added again significant at 10%. These findings followed the circumstance 
mentioned earlier for the political presence, and as expected, with more political 
influence from center-right and center-left side in the board, the results were higher than 
the ones presented in table 4. They follow our hypotheses that, indeed, former 
politicians are able to provide benefits to firms, regarding the access to debt or to 
negotiate opened contracts firms had already established with the banks. 
In firms’ performance models (5) and (6), the Market Capitalization coefficient shows 
significance, anew, since there is a decrease of 31,7 percentage points per party added to 
the appointment with a p-value lower than 10%. No significance still on the dividend 
per share hypothesis. 
Looking over investment decisions, the regression on number of employees shows a 
significant increase of 832 new employees per party added to the appointment with a p-




politically connected firms increases largely with each party bringing along an average 
of 832 new workers to these firms. 
6.3 Center-Right and Center-Left political Connections 
When we take close attention to right and left wing former politicians that entered into 
top executive positions of Portuguese listed companies, there are many implications to 
be drawn. 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
Looking at the benefits provided on access to credit, there is strong empirical evidence 
that such item could be facilitated by political ties to the right wing. This is true for the 
long term borrowing in relative terms (significant at 10%), and even more for the short 
term loans in absolute terms and the interest rate drop (significant at 2,5%). We find no 
such benefits to the firms from the left wing politicians, which seems to indicate that the 
right has closer ties to the banks than the left. Once again, we find no evidence that 
former politicians from either party help lower the tax burden. 
Unlike the two previous cases, such political ties, either from the right or the left, do not 
alter significantly the Market Capitalization. Looking at the Dividend per Share, there is 
a significant decrease of 0,078€ with a p-value of less than 10%. This result contradicts 
our hypothesis, but may be consistent with the fact that left wing politicians seem to 
have more distant ties to the banks than right wing politicians, which may lead 
companies to self finance, and hence reduce dividends. 
In what concerns firms’ risk measured by Altman’s Z-Score, there is empirical evidence 
that left wing political connections lead to increased risk, with the significant (1%) 
decrease in this ratio of 0,953 in absolute values. As this ratio takes into account several 
items, it is hard to trace which are the items that increase or decrease but, it is important 
to mention that such finding could conduct us to realize whether a former politician is a 
boon or a burden for a firm, regarding center-left connections. Indeed, such finding, 
gathering the lack of benefits and the decrease of the Dividends distributed to the 
shareholders, indicate that left wing political connections may be a burden for 
politically connected firms, as the benefits were, most probably, granted when such 
connections were still in the Government and, so, the left wing political tie enters in the 
firm to collect the bounty for past benefits
7
. 
                                                          
7 An alternative explanation may lie on the possibility that the causality is reversed. In other words the companies do not start to 





Over investment decisions field, there is an increase of the number of employees by 
1.416 with a p-value lower than 1%, in the independent variable of right wing political 
connections dummy, and no evidence of similar behavior from left wing politicians. 
The numbers outlined in the previous discussions seem then to confirm that the 
aggressive recruitment policies are mostly induced by the right wing politicians. 
6.4 Relevant governmental experience from the appointee 
In this section we analyze the impact of the previous governmental experience of the 
appointee being related to the industry in which he will now serve. For example, a 
former minister, who served in an area related to the private business he will now lead, 
could add experience and knowledge about the sector and competitors. 
[TABLE 7 HERE] 
Focusing in the benefits provided by such political ties, exhibited in Table 7, there were 
dependent variables explained by this particular political dummy. The weight of Long-
Term Borrowings on Total Assets had a significant increase of 5,738% with a p-value 
lower than 1% and, regarding the effective interest rate bore by firms, there is a 
decrease of 1,724% with a p-value lower than 5%. Compared with the first case, a 
political tie coming from a cabinet coincident with the industry sector of the firm, there 
is empirical evidence that such connections are able to offer, even, higher benefits for 
the connected firm than a common political connection, regarding the Long-Term 
Borrowings and the effective Interest rate endured by the firm. This fact might be 
explained by a superior experience in the sector, which decreases the exposition of the 
lenders, allied to the influence of political connections over the banking industry. 
If such former politicians entered in a firm where they could add value, through their 
experience and know-how as well as they are able to open information about 
competitors’ strategy, it would be expected that Market Capitalization would not 
decrease significantly. Indeed, political dummy does not have significance which it is a 
positive indicator, compared with the first two cases, and it demonstrates this kind of 
political tie does not obliterate firm’s value. However, regarding the Dividend per 
Share, there is a significant decrease of the compensation paid to the shareholder by 
0,0432€ per share, with a p-value of less than 10%. This evidence is contrary to what 
we wrote in the beginning of the paragraph and this situation is hardly explained by a 




Indeed, this empirical evidence might take us to think that this kind of political tie may 
assist the firm when he was in the Government and, at the time he entered in the firm, 
he had already slaked all the opportunities to increase the performance of the firm and, 
so, he enters in the company to receive his share from the arrangements achieved in the 
past. 
At last, with regard to the change of the number of employees, there is a positive change 
of 1.415 employees with a p-value of 1%. Again, this dependent variable exhibited that 
political ties could influence to increase its number, and, perhaps, it would also be 
related with the significant change of the dividend per share distributed by the firm to 
the shareholders, which lead us to other situation: former politicians follow political 
motivations inside a firm and it affects negatively the cash wealth of the shareholders. 
6.5 Former politicians appointed to firms which the Portuguese Government is 
shareholder 
The objective to study 6 firms which the State has a significant number of shares of the 
company, through Parpública or Caixa Geral de Depósitos, was to understand if the 
entrance of a political connection in these firms would have a similar impact as they 
have in other firms. The results exposed a different scenario from the one shared in 
previous cases, as it is presented in Table 8. 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
Looking over the possible benefits supplied by the entrance of a political connection in 
such firms, there is evidence that the effective interest rate has a decrease of 5,909 
percentage points with a p-value of 1%, Long and Short term Borrowings are not 
significantly impacted. This evidence might indicates that firms had already their 
financing needs totally met and the entrance of a political connection will not increase 
their exposition to debt but, instead, politically connected firms might negotiate to 
improve their loan agreements with the banks, successfully. 
In the other fields, there was not significance in the political dummy, presenting that the 
impact of political connections in firms, where the Government has control over the 
board, is much lower than the overall sample, indicating that such political ties received 
higher governance in these firms. The higher highlight is, probably, the insignificance 
over the dependent variable “Number of Employees” while in previous cases the 




be an indication that these firms cannot handle to have more employees because they 
are in the limit, justified by an employer policy motivated by the Government. 
6.6 Political connections affiliated to the party in the Government 
Our last characteristic regards the political connections which coincide with the ruling 
party in the Government, exhibited in Table 9. Our goal was to analyze if a firm 
politically connected to the ruling party, was able to receive higher benefits in access to 
financing concerns as well as tax reliefs and if the performance and risk was reflected in 
this potential advantage. Regarding the number of employees, it is expected that the 
increase in this field would be steeper than the other cases studied. 
[TABLE 9 HERE] 
In fact, when we analyze the likely benefits provided, we conclude that such fields as 
Long Term Borrowings, Short Term Borrowings and Effective Tax Rate are not 
significantly impacted with the entrance of these connections, not confirming that the 
ruling party increases the advantages for politically connected firms. The unique 
variable with significance was the effective interest rate supported by firms, which has a 
decrease of 2,851 percentage points with a p-value of 1%. As the previous section, this 
evidence supports that firms might renegotiate the loan agreements with the banks, 
despite they do not leverage for higher levels, neither with short nor with long 
maturities.  
Although the tests over the performance and risk were not significant, the number of 
employees had a significant increase of 1.475 collaborators with a p-value lower than 
1%, corroborating that, in this specific case, the political connection at the time of not 
only follows political motivations for future elections, but he might also be incited by 
the party to have an employer policy so that the party gets more supporters and more 
acceptance by the general public opinion. This result is somewhat surprising, given that 
the majority of the time in the sample, the ruling party was the left wing party, and the 
corresponding results for this party in table 6 were not significant. 
In an overview, this characteristic was expected to have more significant variables, 
taking into account that such political connections have, supposedly, a deeper network 
of contacts and more power to influence public concourses. However, through empirical 
analysis, these facts were not endorsed, concerning issue of loans, enterprise’s 




After these regressions, we performed the Durbin-Watson with the political dummy in 
the simplest way, and we were able to say that no regression indicates existence of serial 
auto-correlation, demonstrating the existence of homoskedaticity and, so, the variance 
of the errors is constant, which allows the regressions to be estimated over the linear 
least squares. We also calculated the correlation between variables, both dependent and 
independent, with the view to comprehend if our study was biased due to high 
correlations between variables. In fact, none of the variables had shown a correlation 
higher than 20% in relation to other variables, indicating that variables were significant 
and regressions did not suffer any problems of robustness and consistence. 
 
7. Conclusions and Further Research 
This thesis shows that political connections could have a strong impact over the 
Portuguese business environment by influencing several items of a listed firm. We 
proposed to study 5 important fields of firms’ existence, after the entrance of a political 
tie, and to analyze whether firms could beneficiate from such connections or, on the 
other hand, if this event could constitute a burden for the future of the firm. Using a 
measure of announcements based on hand-collected data from Cabo (2012) of top 
positions of publicly traded firms at the EuroNext Lisbon Stock Exchange, this study 
undertakes an event study around the appointments announcements, separating 
appointments with politically connected executives from the other appointments 
One of the top conclusions was, undoubtedly, the capacity of connected political firms 
to obtain external financing from banking entities. In some cases, even when the 
financial needs were already met, there is empirical evidence suggesting the 
renegotiation of the effective interest rate supported by the firm, further denouncing the 
potential influence of former politicians over the banking industry. In fact, the close 
relation between politicians and banks is a known fact, with anecdotic and empirical 
events, which might influence state and private banks to offer better conditions for their 
protected firms. A good example of the close relationship between politicians and 
bankers was shown, in last few months, in Portugal, after the wiretapping between the 
executives from the top investment bank in the country (BESI) and the Prime Minister 
and other top hierarchy politicians of the Government came to public, evidencing the 




Other field which had been affected, by political ties, is the Market Capitalization, 
reflecting a significant decrease in firm’s value, in comparison with non-connected 
firms. In fact, market’s perception of politically connected firms decreases, even after 
the firm’s value adjustment, empirically evidenced, in the same sample, after the 
announcement of the entrance of such connections (Cabo, 2012 ). The benefits granted 
regarding the improvement of access to loans may be executed through irregular steps 
which might force politically connected firms to present worst quality in the annual 
reports than the ones presented by non-politically connected ones and, thereby, it might 
be punished by mistrusted investors. Other reason, that may explain this particular 
downgrade performed by the market, could be associated to the employer policy 
conducted by politically connected firms, since such expansion is not reflected in an 
increase of the cash-flows, in the short-term, which it might decrease market’s interest 
of politically connected firms. 
Looking over that specific subject, the number of employees hired, there is evidence 
that politically connected firms presented, empirically, a more aggressive hiring policy 
than non-political ones, revealing that, in fact, former politicians could have personal 
interests, behind their nomination to the board of a listed firm. It is reasonable to 
consider that politically connected firms hire more employees due to a possible 
expansion of the firm, justified by opened privileges in public contests or influences to 
arrange new customers in the B-to-B segment, although this increase is not followed by 
an increase of the total assets neither by Capital Expenditures, in the period after the 
entrance of a political tie, which does not confirm the theory of growth of the business. 
And, so, it opens the possibility that former politicians are moved by political 
motivations in this particular subject, employing more staff than the firm actually needs 
in order to have a better image and reputation to collect more votes, at the time they are 
running for the Government in the future. 
We also compared the left and the right wing politicians to find that there are 
unquestionable differences between them. Regarding the easy access to debt and the 
increase of the number of employees, only right wing former politicians present 
significant positive changes but, regarding the compensation of the shareholders and 
firm’s measured risk, the entrance of a left wing former politician showed that DPS 
decreases significantly which might be related to the lack of external financing that 




of the shareholders. Firm’s risk, measured with Altman’s Z-Score, is also affected by 
left wing former politicians, since there is a significant increase of the ratio, leading us 
to the fact that such connections might be harmful for a Portuguese listed firm, although 
it is hard to understand which rubrics increase or decrease given that Altman’s Z-Score 
bears several items. 
We had also studied other characteristics that were not included in the thesis, among 
political connections, regarding the number of years each former politician stood in the 
Government and the number of shares each political tie owned at the time he was 
appointed to the board of that company. To perform these specifications, we made 
regressions containing only the political dummy, besides the intercept, and the results 
only confirmed what we have mentioned previously, regarding the easy financing, 
firm’s value and the number of employees. An interesting issue comes from the fact that 
the number of years a former politician stood in the Government may have a lower 
impact in the decrease of firm’s Market Capitalization.  
In Portugal, this sensible theme is still very recent, regarding the existent empirical 
literature and, so, there is a great variety of fields to explore. Looking over to the 
empirical results of this thesis, we believed it would be reasonable to study the quality 
of the information in the reports of politically connected firms, in order to understand 
the significant drop of the Market Capitalization of politically connected firms and, 
raising the employer policy followed by politically connected firms, it would be 
interesting to perceive the staff costs as well as the operational margins hold by such 
firms, after the entrance of a political tie. Finally, we consider it would be interesting to 
analyze the performance of the politically connected firms when the former politician 







Table 1 – Summary of the Sampled Appointments 
Number of Appointments 327 
Total Number of Firms 41 
Total Number of Executive Appointments 1721 
Non-Political appointments 257 
Political appointments 70 
Firms with Political appointments 26 
Total Number of Former Politicians Appointed  60 
 
 
Table 2 – Allocation considered in the study when there is coincidence of cabinet 
positions in the Government and industry group of the firms, to which former 
politician was appointed 
Cabinet position in the Government 
Firm to which the former 
politician was appointed 
Industry Sector 
Industry and Manufacturing Industry Cimpor Building Materials 
Public Works Cimpor Building Materials 
Industry and Innovation Cimpor Building Materials 
Public Works, Transports and 
Communications 
EDP Electric 
Energy EDP Electric 
Public Works, Transports and 
Communications 
EDP Renovaveis Electric 
Industry Fisipe 
Textile and Technical 
Fibres 
Transports and Public Works Galp Oil & Gas 
Economy, Industry and Commerce Galp Oil & Gas 
Distribution and Competition Inapa Forest Products & Paper 
Public Works Martifer 
Engineering & 
Construction 
Public Works Mota-Engil 
Engineering & 
Construction 
Industry and Energy Nova-Base Computers 
Industry and Energy Portugal Telecom Telecommunications 
Extractive Industries and Manufacturing Semapa Cement, Pulp and Paper 
Industry and Commerce SONAE Retail 
Media ZON Media 
General (Prime Minister and Deputy 








Both Parties in the Same Appointment 16 
Center-Right Appointments 36 
Center-Left Appointments 18 
Coincidence functional Area in the Government and Hiring Firm's Industry  48 
Political Appointments in Firms, where the Portuguese Government Holds a Stake 21 





Table 4 – Impact of Political Connections over Benefits, Performance, Risk and 
Investment Decisions on Portuguese listed Firms.  
The table displays results from regressions which take into attention the difference between political and non-political 
nominations for the board of the company. The change of variables was obtained using a window of 2 years: the year 
previous to and the year following the announcement of the nomination. The dataset comprises all appointments of 
boards members made between January of 2001 and December of 2011 by listed companies from the Stock 
Portuguese Exchange. The data, regarding the appointments, was the same of the thesis of Cabo (2012) and the 
variables, regarding benefits, performance, risk and investment decisions from the firms, was taken from Bloomberg 
and firms’ annual reports.  We excluded one firm for which data was not available and we also exclude the banking 
industry. An appointment is considered as political, if any of the appointed board members had a political position 
after the VI Provisional Government in 1976, and prior to the day of the appointment. In that case the Political 
Dummy variable will take the value 1. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 
5%, 2,5% and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or positive, relative to the effect of the 








Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,019 0,027 0,000* -0,010 321 0,016 
       
 
Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Absolute Value of Short-
Term Borrowings (2) 
57.216.161     95.388.855**    - 72.877 - 877.910    323 0,011 
 





∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Interest Rate (3) 0,044 -1,649*** 0,430 0,071 323 0,017 
 





∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -2,293 2,501 -0,023 6,456 323 0,000 

















 ∆ % Market Capitalization 
(5) 
0,461 -0,390* 0,018*** 1,476**** 327 0,087 
 





∆ % Net Income CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Dividend per Share 
(6) 


















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees  
(7) 
-36,835 1.252**** 0,000 0,000 322 0,028 
 
 











∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 






Table 5 – Impact of Political Connections over Benefits, Performance, Risk and 
Investment Decisions on Portuguese listed Firms.  
The table displays results from regressions which take into attention the difference between non-political 
nominations, political nominations with one party and political nominations with two parties. The change of variables 
was obtained using a window of 2 years: the year previously to the announcement of the nomination and the year 
following the announcement of the nomination. The dataset comprises all appointments of boards members made 
between January of 2001 and December of 2011 by listed companies from the Stock Portuguese Exchange. The data, 
regarding the appointments, was the same of the thesis of Cabo (2012) and the variables, regarding benefits, 
performance, risk and investment decisions from the firms, was taken from Bloomberg and firms’ annual reports.  
We excluded one firm for which data was not available and we also exclude the banking industry. Political “Dummy” 
Variable will have the value of 1 if there is only one political party represented in the appointment and the value 2 if 
there are both political parties in the appointment. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to statistical significance 
at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or positive, relative to the effect 








Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,0189*** 0,0218* 0,0002**** 0,0587***** 322 0,062 
       
 
Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Absolute Value of Short-
Term Borrowings (2) 
61.590.444 61.331.938* -82.312 2.083.714 322 0,008 
 





∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Interest Rate (3) -0,071 -0,9001* 0,445 -0,0153 323 0,009 
 





∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -2,459 2,6235 -0,026147 6,345 300 0,000 

















 ∆ % Market 
Capitalization (5) 
0,4618 -0,317* 0,01784*** 1,4853**** 327 0,088 
 





∆ % Net Income CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 


















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees 
(7) 
6,4216 832*** -0,000 0,000 322 0,022 
 
 











∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 






Table 6 - Impact of right and left wing Former Politicians over Benefits, Performance, 
Risk and Investment Decisions on Portuguese listed Firms.  
The table displays results from regressions which takes into attention democratic political nominations and considers 
all the other nominations as non-political. The change of variables was obtained using a window of 2 years: the year 
previously to the announcement of the nomination and the year following the announcement of the nomination. The 
dataset comprises all appointments of boards members made between January of 2001 and December of 2011 by 
listed companies from the Stock Portuguese Exchange. The data, regarding the appointments, was the same of the 
thesis of Cabo (2012) and the variables, regarding benefits, performance, risk and investment decisions from the 
firms, was taken from Bloomberg and firms’ annual reports. We excluded one firm for which data was not available 
and we also exclude the banking industry. Right wing dummy will take the value 1 if there is a former politician from 
a center right government and 0 otherwise and left wing dummy will take the value 1 if there is a former politician 
from a center left government. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% 
and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or positive, relative to the effect of the political 












Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,0183*** 0,0345* -0,0137 0,000* 0,0579**** 322 0,065 
   
 







∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
















∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 











∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -0,6757 -0,2306 6,1145 -0,0447 7,361 323 0,000 
   
 



















 ∆ % Market 
Capitalization (5) 











∆ % Net Income CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 






















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees 
(7) 


















∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 







Table 7 - Impact of Former politicians appointed with coincidence of the cabinet occupied 
in the Government and the industry group of the inviting firm.  
The table displays results from regressions which takes into consideration the entrance of former politicians that 
occupied a similar cabinet in the Government to the industry sector of the welcoming firm. The change of variables 
was obtained using a window of 2 years: the year previously to the announcement of the nomination and the year 
following the announcement of the nomination. The dataset comprises all appointments of boards members made 
between January of 2001 and December of 2011 by listed companies from the Stock Portuguese Exchange. The data, 
regarding the appointments, was the same of the thesis of Cabo (2012) and the variables, regarding benefits, 
performance, risk and investment decisions from the firms, was taken from Bloomberg and firms’ annual reports.  
We excluded one firm for which data was not available and we also exclude the banking industry. The political 
dummy will take the value 1 if there is a coincidence between the cabinet occupied and industry group of the firm, 
reviewed in Table 2, and 0 otherwise. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
2,5% and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or positive, relative to the effect of the 











∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,0224 
**** 
    0,0574****    0,000 -0,01282 321 0,034 





∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Absolute Value of Short-
Term Borrowings (2) 
67.213.061 
**** 
71.845.916 -81.848 6.701.589 323 0,005 
 





∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Interest Rate (3) -0,051 -1,7244** 0,4034 -0,0019 323 0,014 
 





∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -1,1005 4,7833 -0,0469 6,8976 323 0,000 

















 ∆ % Market Capitalization 
(5) 
0,424**** -0,3071 0,0175*** 1,479**** 326 0,014 
 





∆ % Net Income CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 


















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees (7) 4,937 1.415**** -0,000 0,000 317 0,026 
 
 











∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 





Table 8 - Political nominations in firms which the Government has a significant number of 
shares over Benefits, Performance, Risk and Investment Decisions on Portuguese listed 
Firms.  
The table displays results from the regressions which looked over firms whose Government is shareholder. To 
perform this sample, we regarded to the annual reports of Parpública and Caixa Geral de Depósitos, in the last 10 
years. The change of variables was obtained using a window of 2 years: the year previously to the announcement of 
the nomination and the year following the announcement of the nomination. The dataset comprises all appointments 
of boards members made between January of 2001 and December of 2011 by listed companies from the Stock 
Portuguese Exchange. The data, regarding the appointments, was the same of the thesis of Cabo (2012) and the 
variables, regarding benefits, performance, risk and investment decisions from the firms, was taken from Bloomberg 
and firms’ annual reports.  We excluded one firm for which data was not available and we also exclude the banking 
industry. The political dummy will take the value 1 if there is a presence of a former politician in the appointment. 
We obtained the political data from the Portuguese Government website. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or 








Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,0435 -0,001 -0,0122 -0,113 72 0,05 
       
 
Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Absolute Value of Short-
Term Borrowings (2) 
162.109.685 181.177.854 114.672.806 395.537.000 72 0,049 
 





∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Interest Rate (3) -1,479 -5,909**** 12,1687 14,882 68 0,147 
 
      
 
Intercept 
Political Dummy  
(-) 
∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -9,032 3,661 1,927 15,611 72 0,067 










Political Dummy  
(-) 





 ∆ % Market Capitalization 
(5) 
0,0577 -0,037 0,0432* 0,7564**** 72 0,187 
 





∆ % Net Income CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 


















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees (7) 912 -446 -0,000**** 0,000** 72 0,186 
 
 











∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 






Table 9 - Impact of Political connections affiliated to the party in the Government over 
Benefits, Performance, Risk and Investment Decisions on Portuguese listed Firms.  
The table displays results from the regressions which looked over former politicians which, at the time they entered in 
the firms, the Ruling party was the same they represented in the past. The change of variables was obtained using a 
window of 2 years: the year previously to the announcement of the nomination and the year following the 
announcement of the nomination. The dataset comprises all appointments of boards members made between January 
of 2001 and December of 2011 by listed companies from the Stock Portuguese Exchange. The data, regarding the 
appointments, was the same of the thesis of Cabo (2012) and the variables, regarding benefits, performance, risk and 
investment decisions from the firms, was taken from Bloomberg and firms’ annual reports.  We excluded one firm for 
which data was not available and we also exclude the banking industry. The political dummy will take the value 1 if 
the political connection is affiliated to the ruling party. Symbols *, **, *** and **** correspond to statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, 2,5% and 1% level, respectively. In brackets is our prediction, negative or positive, relative 








Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Long-Term Borrowings 
/Total Assets (1) 
-0,0157 0,0148 -0,000 -0,0065 321 0,01 
       
 
Intercept Political Dummy (+) ∆ % CAPEX ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Absolute Value of 
Short-Term Borrowings 
(2) 
67.251.599 85.209.067 -84.579 6.169.902 321 0,006 
 





∆ % Total 
Borrowings 
ROE t Observations R² 
∆ Interest Rate (3) 0,0585 -2,851**** 0,3872 -0,001 323 0,033 
 





∆ % Net Income 2011 Dummy Observations R² 
∆ Tax Rate (4) -1,9764 0,9164 -0,0201 6,198 322 0,000 

















 ∆ % Market 
Capitalization (5) 
0,4338**** -0,4023 0,0176*** 1,5355**** 326 0,008 
 





∆ % Net Income CAPEX Observations R² 


















∆ Total Assets CAPEX t+1 Observations R² 
∆ Number of Employees 
(7) 
47,9 1.475**** -0,000 0,000 317 0,025 
 
 











∆ Altman's Z-Score Ratio 
(8) 
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